Abstract. This talk discusses the nature of different kinds of scales and controversies over issues on the generation of scalar implicatures, particularly those in complex sentences involving disjunction and another operator in its scope, and so on. The pragmatic position based on Gricean reasoning in opposition to the grammatical position based on alternative semantics and LF syntax employing the exhaustivity (Exh) operator will be examined. The context-driven view and the default view largely still within the pragmatic position will also be discussed. In doing so, the talk will offer my position that scalar implicatures are motivated by Gricean pragmatic reasoning but that they are deeply and crucially rooted in the grammatical devices of Contrastive Topic (CT), overt or covert. CT requires PA (pero/aber) conjunction, i.e. 'concessive But' and that's why scalar implicatures begin with but and its equivalents cross-linguistically. The CT operator rather than the exhaustivity (Exh) operator must be represented to be related to the previous discourse and the forward concessive conjunction.
1 Scales
There are many gradable adjectives, to which different degrees of the state of an entity can be assigned such as clean and dirty (Kennedy 1999 ). The adjective clean shows the degree of no dirt on its subject entity (maximum standard, total-universal), as an <e, d> type function, taking an entity and returning a degree. Its antonym dirty, on the other hand, starts from the minimum degree of having dirt on an entity (minimum standard, partial-existential) (Yoon , Lee ).
These adjectives, but not un-gradable adjectives such as alive and dead, can easily be modified by degree adverbs such as a little and very, and intensifiers such as terribly and awfully. But the so-called un-gradable adjectives can also generate scalar implicatures, as will be discussed later.
Gradable adjectives typically constitute scales with degree modification on the same single adjectives (intra-lexically).
In contrast, scales in connection with scalar implicatures may be different in the sense that they are typically formed by a set of scalar alternatives of different lexical items, mostly predicates. Horn's (1972) scalar predicates are related by entailment asymmetrically -a stronger one entails the weaker one in the scale but not vice versa. A sentence containing a scalar value or item can generate a scalar implicature when the scalar value is replaced with a stronger item from the scale, resulting in an alternative sentence. All such stronger alternative sentences are implicated to be negated (or false):
(1) ScalAlt(φ) = {φ': φ contains scalar value s and φ' is formed from φ by replacing only s with a value from the same Horn scale} (2) Scalar Implicatures: ∀ φ' ∈ ScalAlt(φ) . (φ' ⇒ φ) ~> ∼φ' This is a standard neo-Gricean approach to scalar implicature generation mechanism with limited formally defined scalar alternatives from among all possible alternatives generated by Grice's informativeness Maxim of Quantity. Horn scales are as follows: (5) a. Propositions < Korea will beat Togo, Japan will beat Brazil>.
b. Korea will beat Togo ~> But it is not the case that Japan will beat Brazil. Hirschberg (1985) and Matsumoto's (1995) further available scalar implicatures in specific contexts after entailment-based computation as in the exclusivity of disjunction should also be included in my propositional scales. Chierchia (2004) and some other authors recently attacked Gricean and neo-Gricean theories of scalar implicature computation, claiming that these theories based on Gricean reasoning cannot account for the scalar implicatures of certain complex sentences involving disjunction etc.. Thus they proposed grammatical (semantic or syntactic) systems for computing scalar implicatures. Russell (2006) and others, on the other hand, have defended a global, Gricean pragmatic framework, offering arguments against the critics' challenges.
2 Issues
What do experimental studies of processing and acquisition of scalar implicatures say?
Initially Breheny et al (2006) largely supports the context-driven pragmatic approach as opposed to the default approach, which says implicatures are associated with scalar items by 1 Sauerland's (2004) footnote 2 shows one such context: Kai had peas or broccoli is less rewarding than Kai's cleaning up his room. Then, the utterance implicates Kai didn't clean up his room. This implicature is context-specific or particularized, whereas Kai didn't have both peas and broccoli is generalized. It is interesting, however, to note that the relevant evaluative expression 'rewarding' is still a predicate. Such evaluative predicates, saying 'higher in what?' in the scale, must be underlyingly scalar, mediating propositions to scales. 'Tough and glorious' may underlie scale (5). The even-marked utterances are also propositional in likelihood implicature (as Horn, p.c., reminded me). default as generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs). The context-driven approach claims that scalar implicatures arise only if there is some contextual reason, like Grice's particularized conversational implicatures. The default view has a long neo-Gricean tradition from Horn (1972) , Gazdar (1979) , and Horn 1984) to Levinson (2000) and, in a sense, the view is a precursor, with its formally-defined notion of scales, to the proposed view of grammatical (semantic or syntactic) computational systems (CS), although it is still pragmatic with its userelated communicative inferences. This talk will take up some controversies over related issues between the different positions and try to address the big question of whether scalar implicatures are pragmatic inferences or grammar. Tentatively I can say that the generation of scalar implicatures is rooted in and motivated by pragmatic inferences and the interpretation of them is at least schematically and sometimes overtly triggered by grammatical devices of language-specific morphemes or intonation.
Debates

Disjunction Problem
In (3c), the Horn scale of connectives originally had <or, and>, with p and q entailing p or q and with p or q implicating p and q. But Chierchia (2004) indicated that a global approach in general fails to treat implicatures in complex sentences including cases with disjunction and another operator in its scope (also Schwarz 2000), as in (6), and proposed a local semantic system.
(6) Kai had the broccoli or some of the peas last night.
(7) (6) > Kai didn't have the ∼ broccoli and some of the peas last night.
Facing this problem of disjunction with another operator like some in its scope, Sauerland (2004) offered a solution by positing a pair of disjuncts {p, q} or {L, R} in between <or, and> in the scale, making it a partially ordered set. Otherwise, (7) is the only implicature generated and cannot handle (8), which Sauerland argues, is an intuitively adequate scalar implicature generated by (6).
(8) (6) > Kai didn't have all of the peas last night. ∼
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Sauerland bases his claim on the intuition that if I happen to know that Kai ate all the peas last night and hear (6) I would say (9):
(9) No (#Yes), he had all of the peas last night.
Sauerland also discusses scalar items in the scope of negation, a logical operator, but negation reverses scales (Horn 1972 (1982) and Horn (1972 Horn ( , 1989 in viewing implicatures as epistemologically modalized. What follows from Grice's maxims of conversation is that a stronger statement ψ is uncertain (~Kψ), a weak implicature, rather than that ψ is certainly false (K~ψ). K~ψ follows from ~Kψ only if some additional knowledge (such as that Kψ∨K~ψ holds). He arrives at the strong implicatures (7) and (8) of (6), the disjunctive utterance, using the distinction between weak and strong and moving from weak to strong, also using individual disjuncts p and q in (p or q). Sauerland criticizes Chierchia about his drastic departure from Gricean reasoning for a local semantic system on the grounds of the disjunction problem ("not valid") and other empirical facts that are "less than clear." Chierchia heavily relies on the conventional content for his "semantics."
Global vs Local Problem
Russell (2006) ~>Not all of his advisors are crooks.
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Chierchia claims that hearers can make conclusions about the negation of competing utterances as a whole a la Gricean reasoning in (11a.g.) and that implicatures are added to an expression's meaning by the compositional semantics at each type t meaning (extensionalizing). The embedded S in (11) is computed to give a strong meaning of some of his advisors are crooks and not all of his advisors are crooks for (11a.l.). Russell also argues that (11a.l.) follows (11a.g.) in every context where Sam has some belief about whether all of his advisors are crooks.
Russell argues that (11b) is apparently equally felicitous whether or not all of his advisors are crooks -in fact is not needed to cancel that supposition, whereas it is needed to cancel an ordinary scalar implicature, as in (12). (13) shows a case of Contrastive Focus (CF)-marking on some and all, and a restricted meaning of some but not all for some (Carston's explicature).
(12) a. Sam knows that some of his advisors are crooks, and (in fact) they all are.
b. Some of his advisors are crooks, and #(in fact) they all are.
(13) It is better to eat some of the cake than it is to eat all of it.
Russell also treats DE contexts where their operators have a reversed pattern of implicatures. 
Grammar and Exhaustivity
After Chierchia's (2004) semantics for scalar implicatures, Fox (2005) developed his LF syntax, positing an Exhaustivity operator, which is an abstract lexical item largely equivalent to 'only', following the exhaustivity semantics tradition (Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) and others, to treat scalar implicatures in syntax.
Conjunctive Discourse Markers, Contrastive Topic, Scales and Implicatures
There are two different types of contrastive or adversative sentence conjunctions and their corresponding discourse markers (DM), as in:
( I go back to the discussion of scales extended and repeat the propositional type of scales from 1.1 (5a) as (3): (3) propositions < [Korea will beat Togo], [Japan will beat Brazil]>.
Horn is certain about his entailment scales and Hirschberg (1991) takes up some non-entailment scales, arguing that they also show the same scale behavior. I added a scale of entire propositions (of likelihood/easiness), as in (3), and will discuss a wider range of processes scales Hirschberg does not seem to cover shortly. (3) is exemplified by (4) in Korean:
(4) na-nun [hankwuk-i Togo-rul iki-l kes-i-ra-ko]-NUN mit-nun-ta I -TOP Korea -NOM T-ACC beat-PRE COMP-COP-CT believe 'I believe [that Korea will beat Togo] CT . => (But not that Japan will beat Brazil.)
In (4), an overt CT marker -nun is used and if it occurs the implicature of the denial of a higher value is unavoidable. A CT-marked utterance is concessively admitted. If the marker does not occur, the implicature is evoked when the context licenses it, in which case I claim CT is overt.
With the above scales, the principle in (5) applies:
(5) If p is uttered with overt (or covert) CT-marking in it, it is represented as 'CT(p).' Then concessively (and contrastively) (with PA 'But') 'not q' is conveyed (the speaker believes so), with the CT operator being associated with a CT-marked element (focal and topical) in p. In this case, q has a relevant and comparable stronger/higher element in one and the same scale to be denied.
If the elements in a scale are negated, simply the scale is reversed and the same principle applies (with the effect: if not-q is uttered with CT-marking, its representation 'CT(not-q)' conveys concessively (and contrastively) 'p' (a weaker/lower positive element).
(6) Yumi-ka notebook-ul sa-ci-NUN anh -ass-ta => (haciman ---) In (6), the CT operator can be realized at the end of V-ci and can be associated with either with the verb, the object, the predicate, or the subject, depending on which one is focal. The verb and the object can be doubly CT-marked with doubly evoked implicatures and even the subject can be CT-marked at the same time but the triple CT-marking with triple implicatures is hard to compute and is rather avoided.
This talk makes the distinction between typical conversational scalar implicatures however, there may be no scalehood of property/dimensionality as such. Those nouns may denote a list of non-scalar entities. But if they are once CT-marked, they can be said to generate quantity-based scalar implicatures; the total list of items constitute a sum and a CT-marked item is less than the sum and if that item is asserted the sum minus the item is denied to be conveyed as a scalar implicature (Lee 1999) . The CT-marked item's prior potential Topic is the sum. The item is typically a part/kind of the sum denotation but it may be one item of the sum of apparently arbitrarily grouped objects in a special context, e.g., <monster, monster+beauty>. Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) see the denotation of a question as a proposition which expresses the true (quality) and complete (quantity) answer, which is typically interpreted exhaustively, to that question in the same given world. They believe the answer Mary to the question Who came generally implies no one else came and stipulate a semantic exhaustivity operator that relates the answer to the abstract underlying the question. The exhaustivity operator is assumed to have the semantic effect of the word only, defined as Exh(A, P) = {w: w ∈ A and there is no w' ∈ A such that w'< p w and w and w' give the same denotation to all predicates distinct from P}. (17A), then, would mean 'Mia and Sue came and no one else came.' But other non-exhaustive (19) and wondering (18) haciman swusek-un mot haysse 'But she didn't ace the exam'). With only, the negative alternatives are already so assertive that the concessive use of but/(ha)ciman is not applicable in the conjunction or discourse. The concessive meaning of but is not truth-conditional; but and and are identical truth-conditionally. But in a PA but conjunction/discourse, the first conjunct/utterance is concessively admitted and the second one is stronger in its argument, claim or conclusion (Lee 2001, Anscrombre and Ducrot 1977) . The exact translation of (20c) is rather a negative S na chayk sey kwon pakkey an sa-ss-e '(Lit.) I didn't buy beyond three books,' which is not distinct from the second part of (20d) and cannot be followed by it. Therefore, the use of only or its equivalent exh operator for generating a scalar implicature is not well justified.
Contrastive Topic vs Only-like Exhaustivity Operator
As a consequence, Sevi (2005) argues that scalar implicatures are not implicatures and that they are merely entailments of exh (A, Q), where A is taken to be a complete and partial semantic answer to some question Q, which may be explicit or implicit. The effect of the stronger meaning of A is analyzed as an ambiguity -depending on the optionality of the applicability of exh (applied to (17A) but not to (18A, 19A) ). His argument is based on Grice's maxim of quality -a true answer. As long as the stronger meaning of no one/nothing else (in the given domain) is entailed, there cannot be cancellation. But sentences with only and without it behave quite differently regarding their following conjunct/utterance, as we observed above, and the difference must be accounted for.
My claim is that the PA type conjunction/DM is adjusted to occur with a prior concessive conjunct or utterance for the following conjunct or utterance, which is argumentatively stronger, and that overt or covert CT is exactly concessive for coherence between CT and PA. CT (see (6)). This explains why a CT utterance generates a scalar implicature and why a scalar implicature begins with a PA but. So far, conjunction types and information structure have been studied separately.
Metalinguistic Negation or SN (sino/sondern) Conjunction
Let's turn to the use of SN type conjunction/DM, shown in (2), that involves metalinguistic negation (MN). Typically a clause with MN is followed by the second (elliptical) clause led by an SN connective/DM (or connected by a comma/semicolon), distinct in form in most languages except in English (but) and French (mais). The MN clause may sometimes be implicit, as in (22) but rarely the other alternative offered. The pairs of alternatives above are known to get extra heavy stress and I claim all of them constitute Contrastive Focus (CF), which, I claim, comes from a prior alternative disjunctive question (such as (23b)), either explicit or accommodated (Lee 2003) . Then, the metalinguistic or echoed (Carston 1996) alternative is refuted on 'whatever grounds' (Horn 1985) , the target of negation being claimed to be scalar implicatures, aspects of linguistic forms, or even propositions (Horn p.c.) . This is in sharp contrast with concessive admission of the first conjunct/ utterance in CT-PA. In typical MN utterances such as (21) and (22) and requires SN connection. "So, there is no need to hear his opinion" is C's conclusion regarding the argumentative goal.
Further Inferences in Contrastive Topic -Pero/Aber Correlation
Consider the logical contrast of contradiction involving PA in (25a) and the compatibility between the negative pair of opposite gradable adjectives in (25b):
(25) a. *Yumi-nun khu-ciman cak-e *'Yumi is tall but/aber she is short.'
b. Yumi-nun khu-ci-to anh-ciman/ko cak-ci-to anh-e 'Yumi is not tall but is not short either/is neither tall nor short.'
The adjective 'short' is a contrary of 'tall,' entailing 'not tall' and constituting a contradiction with 'tall.' If (25a) changes to 'Yumi is tall (with CT marking in Korean) but (she is) not very tall,' via Quantity-maxim it becomes an instance of CT -PA conjunction. (25b) shows that 'not tall' licenses an in-between range of 'neither tall nor short,' 'short' being a part located at the extreme end of 'not tall.' In this case, the CT -nun cannot occur on both 'tall' and 'short' in Korean. It can occur on 'tall' but -to 'also' must occur on 'short' because of the repeated negation. The additive -to 'also' can occur on both with PA but it must occur on both if the conjunction is -ko 'and.' Turning to a prevalent CT-PA inference like (26) Scalar implicatures are motivated by Gricean pragmatic reasoning but they are deeply and crucially rooted in the grammatical devices of Contrastive Topic (CT), overt or covert. CT requires PA (pero/aber) conjunction, i.e. 'concessive But' and that's why scalar implicatures begin with but and its equivalents cross-linguistically.
